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12.1  Introduction 
Germany has to deal with a double pressure on its fiscal policy that raises 
concerns about the sustainability of the current path of government spending. 
The first pressure stems from the unification of  East and West Germany in 
1990. Because the centrally planned eastern economy was inefficient, output 
in the East fell sharply after unification and a large number of workers became 
unemployed during the first years of transition. As a consequence, the federal 
government continues to transfer resources exceeding 5 percent of West Ger- 
man GDP to the eastern region in order to economically and socially cushion 
the East German transition. The second pressure stems from the sharp increase 
in dependency ratios, which is due to a severe aging of the population. If fertil- 
ity rates continue to be low, by the year 2030 around 25 percent of the popula- 
tion will be age 65 or older, compared to a value of  15 percent in 1995. Conse- 
quently, the elderly dependency ratio, measured as the number of individuals 
aged 65 or older per number of individuals aged 18 to 64, will increase from 
23 to 48 percent by the year 2030. 
How will the burdens of both a dramatically increasing elderly dependency 
ratio and the West-East transfers be distributed among current and future gen- 
erations? Will future generations be stuck with the bill? In order to illustrate 
the intertemporal impact of present and alternative fiscal policies, we employ 
the method of generational accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and 
Kotlikoff (1991, 1992). We show that both unification and aging will impose 
Bernd Raffelhiischen is professor of economics at Albert-Ludwigs-University in Freiburg, Ger- 
many, and professor I1 at the University of  Bergen, Norway. Jan Walliser is an economist in the 
Macroeconomic Analysis Division of the Congressional Budget Office. 
The authors thank Daniel Besendorfer, Holger Bonin, and Christoph Borgmann for excellent 
research assistance. The opinions expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the Congressional Budget Office. 
211 278  Bernd Raffelhiischen and Jan Walliser 
sizable burdens on future German generations if the current paths for spending 
and revenues are maintained. Recent legislation has increased a number of 
taxes and reduced social insurance benefits to help finance the costs of aging 
and economic transition in East Germany. But according to our findings, those 
measures are far from sufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability. 
The paper continues in section 12.2 with a brief description of the macro- 
economic performance and fiscal policy in East, West, and unified Germany 
during the recent past. Section 12.3 documents the data used in the analysis. 
Section 12.4 contains the basic findings and their sensitivity to alternative as- 
sumptions concerning the main parameters, the population projections, and 
the speed of  adjustment of eastern Germany. In section  12.5, we explore the 
generational impacts of alternative fiscal policies. Finally, section 12.6 summa- 
rizes and concludes the paper. 
12.2  Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance 
During the 1980s, West Germany went through a period of  steady though 
not miraculous economic expansion. Real GDP growth topped at a rate of 4 
percent in 1989.' This long-lasting economic upswing prior to the unification 
of East and West Germany in 1990  allowed the Kohl administration to consoli- 
date government finances substantially. Public expenditures fell from approxi- 
mately 50 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to about 45 percent at 
the end of that decade. During the same period the overall public budget deficit 
including the deficit of the social insurance system shrank from its initial level 
of 3.3 percent of GDP until in 1989 the public sector realized a small surplus. 
As a consequence,  the debt-to-GDP ratio rose more slowly after  1980 and 
eventually started to fall as well. All this was achieved despite a relatively high 
unemployment rate of  8 percent and above. Overall, West Germany seemed 
to be well prepared at the eve of unification since inflation was low due to a 
credible anti-inflationary policy; the overall public budget was balanced, tax 
burdens had been lowered considerably during the 1980s, and national saving 
rates continued to be high. 
The opposite was true for the then still independent East German state. De- 
spite the economic progress reflected in the socialist government's official sta- 
tistics, problems of the Soviet-style command economy were aggravated dur- 
ing the  1980s. Timid and reluctantly introduced changes in the early  1980s 
returned some economic freedom to firms but failed to induce higher efficiency 
because price controls were still maintained. Similar inefficiencies arose from 
the fully controlled labor market with an inflexible wage structure and only 
minor wage differentiation. Additionally, the attempt to catch up with emerg- 
ing western high-tech industries failed and the concentration of investment in 
I. If not indicated otherwise, the statistical figures are taken from Council of Economic Advisors 
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those capital-intensive areas worsened the already severe deterioration of the 
eastern capital stock in other industries. Most notably, the stock of the con- 
sumer durables industry (including housing) as well as the public infrastruc- 
ture suffered from general capital consumption. Moreover, significant parts of 
industrial capital became obsolescent because the East German economy was 
not subject to international competition through trade. In 1989 mounting eco- 
nomic and social pressure ignited political change in Eastern Europe that even- 
tually resulted in the opening of the Berlin Wall and the first free elections in 
the former GDR. These events were quickly followed by economic and mone- 
tary union between the two German states, and official unification in October 
1990.*  Two stylized facts most accurately illustrate the initial economic differ- 
ences between the two newly unified states. First, labor productivity as well as 
per capita GDP in the East amounted to only one-third of the western level. 
Second, the per capita endowment with industrial capital and public infrastruc- 
ture corresponded to less than 50 percent of that in West Germany. Industrial 
capital was mostly outdated, and considerable parts of housing and public in- 
frastructure were in bad shape. As a result, the standard of living in East Ger- 
many lagged far behind that in West Germany. 
Additionally, monetary policy caused a severe adjustment shock for the east- 
ern economy. When both countries agreed on economic, monetary, and social 
union in July 1990, East Germany adopted the deutsche mark and converted 
wages and prices at par. As a result the former state-owned firms were over- 
loaded since eastern output prices collapsed and input costs skyrocketed. In 
fact, many  firms did  not  survive, which  caused  a  transitory  drop of  full- 
employment labor productivity to 22 percent of the western level in the begin- 
ning of  1991. One year later, both full-employment labor productivity and per 
capita output caught up with the preunification level. Presently, they reach 
about  50 percent  of  those  in  the West.  Despite  the  economic depression, 
though, real wages more than doubled from about one-third of the western 
level in 1990 to around 70 percent of western wages in 1996. 
Not surprisingly this wedge between the full-employment marginal product 
and the actual costs of labor induced massive unemployment. According to the 
official rates, registered unemployment first increased to a maximum of 15.9 
percent of the civilian workforce in 1993 and has decreased slightly since then. 
However, the eastern numbers do not accurately reflect reality because hidden 
unemployment exists. If workers participating in retraining and labor creation 
programs, short-time employees, and early retirees were considered in addition 
to the officially unemployed, the 1992 unemployment rate would reach 36.7 
percent. In  1996, this figure is expected to be around 23 percent. This drop 
in hidden unemployment can mostly be attributed to the reduced labor force 
participation rates of  women and elderly workers as well as migration and 
2. A more detailed analysis of the macroeconomic effects of German unification can be found 
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Table 12.1  West-East lkansfer, Additional Public Receipts, and Public Debt in 
lkansition (billions of U.S. dollars) 
1991  1992  1993  1994  I995 
Net transfers 
Total  73.9  91.6  95.0  91.5  112.6 
Percentage of  western GDP  3.8  4.5  4.6  4.2  5.0 
Total  840.7  921.4  957.5  1,015.2  1,054.7 
Percentage of total GDP  42.1  42.8  43.4  43.7  43.6 
Total tax revenue 
Public debt 
Total  820.9  940.7  1,055.4  1,162.3  1,394.8 
Percentage of total GDP  41.1  43.7  47.8  50.1  57.7 
Sources: Council of Economic Advisors (Sachverstihdigenrat  1995, 1996);  Deutsche Bundesbank 
(recent issues). 
commuting to the West since the growth of East German employment has been 
sluggish. During the same period, western unemployment reached a long-term 
minimum at a rate of 6.6 percent in 1992, but it has risen dramatically after- 
ward to a level of almost 10 percent. 
Given that relatively generous West German social insurance programs were 
extended immediately to the East in 1990 it is not surprising that seven years 
after unification, unification-related burdens are still at the heart of  the fiscal 
debate. The assistance provided includes benefits for the unemployed, social se- 
curity payments for old and early-retiring workers who never contributed to 
the West German social security program, income support for employees par- 
ticipating in active labor market programs, welfare for the needy, and other 
smaller programs. Furthermore, direct investments in public infrastructure and 
private investment subsidies are part of  a long-term fiscal strategy aimed at 
triggering high growth in the East. Since the latter would reduce the size of 
transfers and increase tax revenues, public investment and investment tax cred- 
its could be partly self-financing. Currently, however, per capita tax revenues 
in the East are less than 40 percent of the western figures. Thus, for the time 
being, public expenditures for East Germany must largely be financed by West 
German taxpayers and through deficits. 
Table 12.1 shows the overall fiscal implications of  the German unification 
between  1991 and  1995. During these years, net public  transfers increased 
from $73.9 to $112.6 billi~n.~  Net transfers are predicted to stay at a level of 
approximately 5 percent of western GDP in the medium-term future. As a rule 
of thumb, about two-thirds of these annual transfers represent income support, 
one-fourth is spent on public investment, and the remainder provides for sub- 
stantial investment subsidies (Brocker and Raffelhuschen 1997).  As table 12.1 
also indicates, transfers were only partly financed through increases in taxes. 
In particular, most additional revenues were collected through (1) the introduc- 
3. Throughout the analysis we apply the average 1995 exchange rate of  DM 1.43 per dollar. 281  Unification and Aging in Germany: Who Pays and When? 
tion of an income tax surcharge in July 1992, which was suspended between 
July  1993 and January  1995, (2) higher value-added taxes, (3) a significant 
increase in receipts from gasoline and insurance taxes, and (4) higher contribu- 
tions to unemployment insurance and social security. According to the official 
statistics, total taxes as a percentage of total GDP only rose from 42.1 percent 
in 1991 to 43.6 percent in 1995. Note that eastern GDP accounts for approxi- 
mately 12 percent of the western figure. Although it is difficult to attribute the 
revenue increase to the various sources, table 12.1 indicates that unification- 
related tax increases account for only a small part of the required transfers. As 
a consequence of  insufficient additional revenues, the deficits of  the public 
sector increased sharply. Furthermore, public debt was pushed up by the debt 
of the former East German state and the privatization of former state-owned in- 
dustrial conglomerates. Altogether, the debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 41.1 per- 
cent in 1991 to 57.7 percent in 1995. 
In addition to unification-related fiscal burdens the German welfare system 
will suffer from a pronounced aging of the population. For more than 20 years, 
in both East and West, the fertility rate has been below the replacement value. 
Presently, the West German gross fertility rate is as low as 1.4. In the East, the 
number has declined even further to 0.9 after unification. Hence, according to 
official projections (Sommer 1994), the elderly dependency ratio-measured 
as the number of individuals aged 65 or older per number of  individuals aged 
18-64-will  rise from 22.9 percent in 1995 to 47.7 percent in 2040. The aging 
process will have severe implications on three branches of the social security 
system, that is, the pension system, the health insurance system, and the re- 
cently introduced system of long-term care insurance. All of these are financed 
via pay-as-you-go (paygo) schemes and are fairly generous at the moment. For 
example, the pension system provides for a net replacement rate that exceeds 
70 percent for an average production worker, and the average initial retirement 
age is approximately 60 years for females and slightly higher for males. If this 
generosity is to be maintained despite the demographic transition, payroll taxes 
will rise from 18.6 percent of gross income in 1995 to over 35 percent in 2035 
(Boll, Raffelhuschen, and Walliser 1994,94). Similar increases in contribution 
rates will be necessary for long-term care insurance and health insurance. 
The German government responded to the demographic pressure in 1992 by 
reducing the incentives for early retirement and lowering the replacement rate 
for future generations. More recently, the payroll tax rate was increased to 19.2 
percent in  1996 and 20.3 percent in  1997. Additionally, expenditure ceilings 
have been imposed on suppliers of health care. But these reforms are not suffi- 
cient to guarantee the financial sustainability of the paygo scheme. 
12.3  Data Description 
As outlined in chapter 2 of this volume we require (1) a population projec- 
tion, (2) projections of  average net taxes by  age and sex, (3) an estimate of 
government net wealth, (4) a discount rate, and (5)  a projection of government 282  Bernd Raffelhiischen and Jan Walker 
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purchases. In  order to correctly reflect differences in net remaining lifetime 
payments between the eastern and western parts of Germany we perform gen- 
erational accounting separately for the two parts of  Germany. This requires 
region-specific projections of  the population and of  average future tax  and 
transfer payments. 
Our demographic projection takes the 1994 population as a starting point. 
We then closely follow the official baseline projections of the German Bureau 
of the Census (Sommer 1994) up to the year 2030. In particular, the western 
gross fertility rate is held constant at its 1994 value of  1.39; the eastern rate 
linearly increases from an initial value of 0.77 to the western figure until year 
2005. Holding this fertility rate constant beyond the year 2030 would result in 
a continuously shrinking population. Since we consider such an outcome to be 
unrealistic we assume that fertility rates increase linearly in both regions be- 
tween 2030 and 2070 and remain stationary at their 2070 levels thereafter. This 
results in a stationary population of 54 million from 2120 onward. With respect 
to mortality, we assume in line with the official estimates that life expectancy 
at birth of  males (females) increases from 73.2 (79.6) years in  1994 to 74.7 
(81 .l)  years in  2000 and remains constant thereafter. Net  immigration de- 
creases from 420,000 in 1994 to 200,000 in 2010 and all following years; im- 
migration of  ethnic Germans from Eastern  Europe is phased  out until the 
year 2010. 
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state, and local governments, and the social insurance system. Although the 
numbers of our base year 1995 are drawn from official statistics, some of them 
are not directly comparable to published statistics due to substantial correc- 
tions for intergovernmental or interadministrative payments. Additionally, we 
generally attribute administrative costs and other non-insurance-related expen- 
ditures of the social insurance system to government consumption. Aggregate 
revenues include taxes on labor income, taxes on capital income, value-added 
tax, gasoline tax, insurance tax, vehicle tax, and other excise taxes, as well as 
seigniorage and social insurance payroll taxes.4  Transfers include payments of 
the various branches of  social insurance,* welfare benefits, and housing, child, 
and maternity support payments. Additionally, we calculate educational trans- 
fer spending for public kindergartens, schools, and universities. All revenue 
and expenditure projections take enacted and planned changes into account. In 
particular, our numbers reflect a 2 percentage point reduction in the solidarity 
surcharge tax in 1998, the removal of the wealth tax in 1997, the phasing in of 
long-term care insurance with concomitant reductions in general welfare spend- 
ing, the increase of the social security payroll tax in  1997, and increases in 
retirement age after the year 2000. 
Aggregate taxes and transfers are distributed by age and sex in accordance 
with region-specific relative age-sex profiles. These profiles are retrieved from 
two microdata surveys, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey. Furthermore, health care spending is distrib- 
uted according to special health insurance data (Bundesministerium fur Arbeit 
und Sozialordnung 1996b). Finally, education age-sex profiles are estimated 
from both the SOEP data and the Commission of Federal and State Govern- 
ments (Bund-Lander-Kommission  1996). Except for the above-mentioned en- 
acted adjustments in revenues and expenditures we assume that 1995 per cap- 
ita taxes and transfers increase with the rate of productivity growth. 
The calculation of government net wealth starts with the official debt of the 
public  sector including  all off-budget  funds, which  are the German Unity 
Fund, the Unification Debt Fund, the European Recovery Program, and pub- 
licly owned railway companies (Deutsche Bundesbank, recent issues). From 
the entire net financial debt of $1,394.8 billion in  1995, we attribute to East 
Germany  $436.26  billion,  which  predominantly  reflects  unification-related 
special debt funds.'j 
4. The aggregate for labor income taxes includes taxes on wages, salary payments, and imputed 
labor income taxes of the self-employed. For the self-employed, the residual represents capital 
income taxes. Capital income taxes also include corporate taxes, local business taxes on capital, 
and various minor taxes on wealth and property. Excise taxes include those indirect taxes not 
included elsewhere and comprise tobacco taxes and a range of special taxes on commodities. 
5. In  1995, the government started to phase in long-term health care insurance. Due to specific 
arrangements upon introduction, that social insurance realized a surplus (see table 12.2) in our 
base year. Starting in 1996, we assume that expenditures catch up with growth-adjusted revenues 
so that the system operates on a pure paygo basis. 
6. The division of debt is necessary only for our calculation of hypothetical West German ac- 
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In calculating government consumption we subtracted transfers, other reve- 
nues net of subsidies, net investment (without education), educational expendi- 
tures, and interest payments from the sum of total expenditures. In 1995 gov- 
ernment spending on goods and services amounted to $359.2 billion (see table 
12.2). Note that both  our residual method and the exclusion  of educational 
services and investment purchases imply that the figure is not directly compa- 
rable with the official statistics and should more accurately be labeled “non- 
age-specific  government  expenditures.”  Future government  consumption  as 
well as future net investment and other revenues net of subsidies are projected 
by assuming that per capita spending and receipts grow at a prespecified rate 
of  economic  growth after  1995.’  All  future receipts  and payments  are dis- 
counted to the base year 1995 using an interest rate of 5 percent in the baseline 
calculations, while annual productivity growth is assumed to be 1.5 percent. 
Those figures approximate the long-run interest rate as well as productivity 
growth in West Germany during the past two decades. 
Capital income taxes receive special treatment since tax-favored investment 
implies a higher tax burden on old capital relative to new capital. Ultimately, 
the current owners of assets bear the burden of the tax due to the drop in the 
market value of  old capital. We estimate this tax burden to be equal to 18.5 
percent of the value of private western physical capital and impose this amount 
as a one-time tax on living western generations. Our calculation utilizes empir- 
ical findings on German capital taxation  by  Leibfritz (1993).  Moreover, the 
flow of capital income taxes is also adjusted, since the current flow overstates 
the burden on future generations due to the difference between the marginal 
tax rate on new capital and the observable average tax rate over both old and 
new capital. With the tax burden of existing capital attributed to living genera- 
tions, future generations are only affected by the marginal tax rate (Auerbach 
et al. 1991). Owing to high marginal tax rates we estimate a 36 percent down- 
ward revision of the flow of western capital income taxes.* 
12.4  Basic Findings 
12.4.1  Baseline Results 
For a proper estimate of the intergenerational stance of fiscal policy in Ger- 
many we need to address the issues arising from the ongoing convergence pro- 
cess between the eastern and western parts. So far, the immediate adjustment 
7. We  assume identical per capita government consumption in East and West Germany. How- 
ever, this is only of importance for our calculation of separate West German accounts. 
8. We refrain from similar explicit capital income tax adjustments for the relatively small eastern 
capital stock. Nevertheless, since we assume that the flow of eastern capital income tax payments 
will adjust to western levels in the future, they include a correction for the difference between 
marginal and average tax  rates, as for the West. Overall, the adjustments happen to have only 
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of East German social entitlements to western standards stands in sharp con- 
trast to the slow economic catching-up process. As outlined above, eastern resi- 
dents’ per capita taxes are currently lower than in the West, whereas a number 
of  transfers,  specifically unemployment  benefits and female social security 
benefits, exceed western levels on a per capita basis. Upon successful transfor- 
mation, they may  eventually converge toward western levels as eastern per 
capita income and consumption expenditures approach those of western resi- 
dents. Whether and when this will occur is uncertain. 
As a reference point, we assume full convergence by the year 2010; that is, 
eastern tax payments and transfer receipts are assumed to increase or decrease 
uniformly such that equality with western per capita values is achieved within 
a period of 15 years. This optimistic viewpoint, which is in line with the results 
by Burda and Funke (1995) and Brocker and Raffelhiischen (1997), will be 
subject to further sensitivity analysis. In accordance with recent legislation, the 
surcharge of 7.5 percent on income tax owed is reduced by 2 percentage points 
in 1998 and removed after the year 2010 in the baseline simulations because 
the surcharge was originally intended  to be eliminated upon completion of 
the transition. 
Panel A of table 12.3 reports the generational accounts for cohorts between 
ages 0 and 90 in the base year 1995. Moreover, it shows the future net payments 
of representative male and female German generations under baseline assump- 
tions. All columns reveal a typical life cycle pattern; that is, young generations 
face positive net payments to the government over their remaining life cycle 
while older generations are net recipients. In particular, currently newborn in- 
dividuals pay  $97,100. Due to both negative net payments during childhood 
and the discounting of  future tax payments, the accounts first increase with 
age. They reach a maximum value of  $313,600 at age 20 when the cohort 
enters the labor force and decrease over the years of active labor market partici- 
pation. At age 50, accounts turn negative since the present value of gross pay- 
ments falls short of the present value of benefits received over the remaining 
life cycle. As individuals approach retirement, the relative weight of future 
pensions and old-age services increases and the generational accounts further 
decrease until they reach a minimum at age 65. At this age, the remaining 
future benefits net of tax payments amount to $206,700. Clearly, with higher 
ages, the negative values decrease due to a decrease of the remaining life span. 
As also shown in table  12.3, the future age-specific net payments of male 
and female agents display a similar life cycle pattern  as those for men and 
women combined. However, due to both a comparatively low labor force par- 
ticipation rate and substantial gender-specific redistribution via all branches of 
the social insurance system, female net payments are at most half of the respec- 
tive male net payments while the accounts during old age range only slightly 
below those of males. 
Future generations are left with a growth-adjusted payment of $248,800, 
which exceeds the payment of current newborns by 156.1 percent if our (fairly Table 12.3  Generational  Accounts of Current and Future Generations 
(thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Generation’s 
Age in 1995  Average  Male  Female 
A. Baseline 
0  97.1  155.2  36.0 
5  123.6  190.3  53.6 
10  179.0  257.8  95.9 
15  252.2  345.8  153.3 
20  313.6  422.4  199.3 
25  303.4  416.4  181.8 
30  271.8  382.9  151.1 
35  224.4  318.4  124.0 
40  160.1  234.4  82.8 
45  94.0  147.4  38.5 
50  -4.2  26.3  -35.4 
55  -98.9  -96.3  -101.5 
60  -  183.6  -212.4  -  155.5 
65  -206.7  -245.8  -171.9 
70  -  180.7  -216.0  -  160.3 
75  -  150.2  -  178.4  -  136.0 
80  -  109.6  -  133.6  -99.3 
85  -68.0  -86.2  -61.6 
90  -3.2  -  10.8  -0.8 
Future generations  248.8  397.9  92.3 
Percentage difference  156.1  156.4  156.4 
B. Baseline, Educarion Included in Government Consumption 
0  165.0  224.3  102.5 
5  194.3  262.4  122.8 
10  233.8  314.2  149.0 
15  287.9  383.2  187.4 
20  333.6  445.1  216.5 
25  309.7  425.1  185.5 
30  271.8  383.0  151.2 
35  224.4  318.4  124.0 
40  160.1  234.4  82.8 
45  94.0  147.4  38.5 
50  -4.2  26.3  -35.4 
55  -98.9  -96.3  -101.5 
60  -183.6  -212.4  -  155.5 
65  -206.7  -245.8  -171.9 
70  -  180.7  -216.0  -  160.3 
75  -  150.2  -  178.4  -  136.0 
80  -  109.6  -  133.6  -99.3 
85  -68.0  -86.2  -61.6 
90  -3.2  -  10.8  -0.8 
Future generations  316.8  430.9  197.0 
Percentage difference  92.0  92.2  92.2 287  Unification and Aging in Germany: Who Pays and When? 
optimistic) baseline representation of German fiscal policy is correct. Despite 
the increases in revenues related to unification (see table 12.  l), there is, in fact, 
a severe generational imbalance to the disadvantage of future generations. The 
imbalance can alternatively be expressed as the ratio of present value of net tax 
payments to present value of lifetime labor income. According to our findings, 
current newborns’ net tax payments will account for 21.3 percent of their life- 
time labor income. The respective gender-specific rates are 24.9 and 12.9 per- 
cent for males and females. Future generations will face a 156 percent higher 
burden, which translates into a net lifetime tax rate of 54.5 percent. 
Panel B of table 12.3 shows the generational accounts under the assumption 
that educational expenditures are not distributed to the respective age groups 
but included in government consumption. Earlier studies built on this approach 
due to the lack of  appropriate data, so we report the corresponding results in 
order to make our findings comparable to earlier results (see Gokhale, Raffel- 
hiischen, and Walliser 1995). Including education in government consumption 
increases the present value of net payments of newborn and future generations 
by  the same amount. This is due to the fact that the present value of  future 
government consumption increases by the same amount as the sum of net taxes 
paid by currently living generations when education is no longer treated as a 
transfer. The described change in accounting methodology reduces the gener- 
ational imbalance to 92.0 percent. Note that educational transfers are only 
geared toward agents below age 30. Thus the generational accounts of older 
agents are unchanged. Without accounting for educational transfers net tax 
rates of  current newborn and future generations are, of  course, significantly 
higher. In particular, those born in the base year will face a rate of 36.3 percent, 
while future generations will experience a rate of nearly 70 percent. 
Table 12.4 decomposes generational accounts into the specific tax payments 
and transfer receipts. All components add up to the net payments found in the 
“average” column in panel A of table 12.3. Note that progressive labor income 
taxes and the proportional contributions to all social insurance tend to be con- 
centrated on agents, predominantly males, between ages 25 and 65. Other 
taxes, specifically value-added taxes and excise taxes, are much more equally 
spread over the life cycle. Social security benefits on the other hand are paid 
mostly after age 60, and health insurance benefits also are larger for retirees. 
In  contrast, unemployment benefits are targeted toward working-age agents, 
and general welfare payments support poor families, especially with children, 
as well as the elderly poor. Youth and maternity assistance are clearly most 
prominent at childbearing ages and below. The “education” column in table 
12.4 reveals the important impact of the assumptions concerning the treatment 
of educational expenditures. Including education in government consumption 
would allocate the benefits more or less equally over the cohorts while, in fact, 
the incidence falls heavily on the young. 
Which factors contribute to the intergenerational  imbalance? To some extent Table 12.4  Composition of Generational  Accounts: Present Value of Payments and 
Receipts (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Tax Payments 
Labor  Capital  Value-  Excise 
Generation’s  Income  Income  Added  Taxes and  Social 




















69.6  11.9 
79.4  13.6 
93.3  15.8 
108.5  28.7 
125.2  34.6 
123.5  29.1 
113.9  30.0 
102.0  31.3 
85.4  30.5 
66.9  38.7 
42.8  30.0 
20.2  25.8 
5.9  21.6 
0.7  18.5 
0  18.5 
0  16.2 
0  16.7 
0  14.6 
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Table 12.5  Four Alternative Ways to Restore Generational Balance (difference 
from base-year revenues/expenditures) 
Option  Change (%) 
Increase in income tax revenues  29.5 
Cut in government purchases  25.9 
Cut in transfer payments  14.1 
Increase in all tax revenues  9.5 
the imbalance is due to the base-year financial debt of $1,394.8 billion. Assum- 
ing that there were no debt at all in the baseline scenario, the imbalance would 
decrease. However, future generations would still pay 80.6 percent more than 
newborns. The major source of generational imbalance in Germany stems from 
the severe aging process. Without demographic change, that is, if the popula- 
tion structure remained constant at the 1995 proportions, future generations 
would pay 7.6 percent less than current newborns. The figures for these cal- 
culations including education in government consumption are 47.5  for the 
no-debt scenario and -4.7  percent for the scenario without any demographic 
change. 
As an additional way  of indicating the generational imbalance we consider 
alternative tax or transfer policies that ensure equal burdens on current new- 
borns and future generations. Table  12.5 summarizes specific tax revenue in- 
creases or transfer reductions as percentages of base-year revenues or expendi- 
tures necessary to restore generational balance. In Germany, an immediate and 
perpetual increase of 29.5 percent of the income tax or an overall tax increase 
of 9.5 percent would eliminate the imbalance. This finding implies that income 
tax revenues must be increased from 12.9 percent of  GDP to 16.7 percent of 
GDP in order to eliminate the burden. Alternatively, increasing total tax reve- 
nues from 39.8 percent of  GDP to 43.6 percent of  GDP would suffice. An 
equal burden could also be achieved by cutting all transfer payments by  14.1 
percent or cutting government purchases by 25.9 percent. Those cuts represent 
4.0 and 4.2 percent of GDP, respectively. The policy options for restoring gen- 
erational balance under the assumption that education is included in govern- 
ment consumption display identical results. Although it is unclear which policy 
or policy combination is most appropriate, it is important to note that the alter- 
native options differ significantly with respect to the time path of budget defi- 
cits and surpluses as well as intragenerational redistribution between currently 
living males and females. 
12.4.2 
As outlined above, the German unification imposed not only a burden on 
future generations but also on presently living western residents through vari- 
ous unification-induced tax increments. To  illustrate how the burden of unifi- 
cation is distributed among western residents, we calculate hypothetical gener- 
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ational accounts for the West under a scenario where no unification-related tax 
or contribution increases are imposed on western  resident^.^ Moreover, in this 
scenario government spending on goods and services excludes spending on the 
eastern region. The “without taxes” columns in table 12.6 show the net pay- 
ment burdens for western  residents under baseline assumptions but without 
unification-related tax hikes. The table also exhibits the generational accounts 
of  western residents including these tax payments as well as the differences 
between the two cases. The age- and gender-specific differences indicate the 
changes in western net payments due to unification. Western residents of all 
ages will share in the burden of unification, but the burdens on those aged 55 
or younger are especially large. On average, the percentage increase in burden 
of male and female retirees is only one-tenth of the respective figure for west- 
ern residents aged 55 or younger. It is clear from table 12.6 that in comparison 
to males, females contribute generally less in absolute but always significantly 
more in relative terms. 
The reason for this distribution of the additional burden is straightforward. 
Most of the additional net payment burdens arise from proportional social in- 
surance taxes and indirect taxes for both male and female western generations, 
while revenues from the progressive solidarity surcharge tax range third. More- 
over, the surcharge will be phased out by 2010, which lowers its impact on 
future direct tax burdens. Indirect tax payments are much more evenly spread 
over the life cycle and the two sexes. Therefore, the additional tax load of the 
elderly is almost entirely paid via indirect taxes. To conclude, contributors to 
social insurance and females contribute more than proportionally to the burden 
of unification if the preunification tax system serves as a reference. 
Our calculations show two effects of unification on the intertemporal redis- 
tribution: If we exclude East Germany and all unification-related  taxes as de- 
fined earlier, the resulting intergenerational redistribution in West Germany 
would be 229 percent, which is larger than the intergenerational redistribution 
in unified Germany. However, had West Germany raised  unification-related 
taxes without having to finance unification,  redistribution would only be 81 
percent. This implies that (a) perpetually raising unification-related  taxes fi- 
nances more than  the transition  of the East, assuming that the transition is 
completed in year 2010; and (b) taking the tax hikes after unification as given, 
the additional burden of financing the East German transition is about as large 
as total current debt; that is, if debt were zero the burden of future generations 
in unified Germany would be approximately as large as the burden of future 
western residents without unification. Note, however, that this does not imply 
50 percent of the current imbalance should be attributed to unification  since 
unification caused both higher spending and higher revenues and these effects 
cannot be separated. 
9. The method of decomposing generational accounts with respect to residence was first em- 
ployed by Gokhale et al. (1995). Table 12.6  Burden of Unification on Western Residents 
~~ 
Male Net Payments  Female Net Payments 
Generation's  Without  With  Male  Percentage  Without  With  Female  Percentage 
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12.4.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
Table  12.7 summarizes the sensitivity of our results with respect to varia- 
tions in (1) the key parameters, (2) the underlying population projection, and 
(3) prolonged adjustment paths for East Germany. The top panel of the table 
reports percentage differences between newborn and future generations’ net 
payments for alternative interest rate  (3, 5, and 7 percent) and growth rate 
(1, 1.5, and 2 percent) combinations. The imbalance is strictly increasing with 
lower growth rates and higher interest rates. Differentials span a wide range 
from 79.3 to 563.4 percent. Apparently, the percentage difference is quite sen- 
sitive to parameter variations, while the qualitative result that postunification 
fiscal policy in Germany is imbalanced is sustained for a realistic range of 
growth and discount rates. The sensitivity to parameter variations for the re- 
sults when education is included in government consumption (not shown) is 
lower but leads to similar conclusions. 
Table 12.7 also reports the intergenerational stance of fiscal policy for alter- 
native population projections. As it turns out, the results are not very sensitive 
to the baseline assumption of increasing fertility rates after the year 2030. If 
we assume a constant low fertility rate corresponding to the 1994 level of West 
Germans up to the year 2200, the generational imbalance increases to 161.4 
percent at baseline parameter values. However, our results depend on the speed 
of convergence between East and West Germany. Clearly, the imbalance will 
increase if  the eastern economy does not completely catch up by  the year 
2010-not  surprisingly, given the high transfer level as well as the small tax 
base in the eastern region. Table 12.7 indicates the quantitative impacts of more 
pessimistic assumptions concerning the adjustment process. Specifically, if the 
adjustment process were completed by  2020 instead of  2010 the burden of 
future generations would increase to 170.2 percent. An adjustment lasting until 
2030 causes an imbalance of  181.8 percent. A higher speed of  convergence 
thus significantly reduces the burden of future generations. 
12.5  Unification- and Aging-Related Policies 
As mentioned above, the Kohl administration has already decided on a par- 
tial phase-out of  the solidarity surcharge tax, that is, a reduction from 7.5 to 
5.5 percent by  January  1998. According to initial intentions, the income tax 
surcharge should last as long as it is “deemed necessary” for facilitating the 
process of  adjustment, and this is exactly what we  assumed in the baseline 
scenario. Nevertheless, a range of possibilities with regard to its adoption and 
longevity are under discussion. We  explore the consequences of the income 
tax surcharge by examining the results of (a) fully eliminating the surcharge 
“prematurely” in the year 2000 and (b) maintaining it at a rate of 5.5 percent 
for all future years. In each case, the transition is assumed to last until 2010. 
Table  12.8 shows  the  changes  in  net  payment  burdens  from  the  two Table 12.7  Sensitivity Analysis: Generational Imbalance between Current and Future Generations (percent) 
g=1  g = 1.5  g=2 
r=3  r=5  r=7  r=3  r=5  r=l  r=3  r=5  r=l 
Generational imbalance  101.9  188.3  563.4  89.9  156.1  387.5  79.3  132.6  288.0 
Population Projection  Year East Catches Up 
Constant  Baseline  Constant 
Population Structure  Assumptions  Fertility (1994)  2010  2020  2030 
Generational imbalance  -7.6  156.1  161.4  156.1  170.2  181.8 
Nore: g is productivity growth (percent); r is discount rate (percent). 294  Bernd Raffelhiischen and Jan Walliser 
Table 12.8  Generational  Accounts for Alternative Surcharge Tax Scenarios and 
Partial Funding of Social Insurance (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Generation’s  Surcharge  Surcharge  Partial 
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experiments relative to the baseline. Fully eliminating the surcharge in the year 
2000 reduces net payments of basically all cohorts. This implies a 5.2 percent- 
age point larger burden of future generations compared to the baseline. In con- 
trast, permanently maintaining the surcharge imposes losses on living genera- 
tions amounting, for example, to $2,400 for 30-year-old agents. However, this 
policy would reduce the generational imbalance of current German fiscal pol- 
icy in our baseline scenario from 156.1 to 139.0 percent. 
As far as the demographic pressure on the paygo-financed social insurance 
system is concerned, the recent debate about aging-related problems concen- 
trates on imposing a ceiling for future increases of the contribution rate. How- 
ever, the discussion is dominated by rather ad hoc fixed upper limits for sup- 
posedly sustainable rates. We therefore calculate contribution rates for social 
security, health insurance, and long-term care insurance that equally distribute 
the implicit demographic burden of social insurance among living and future 
generations.’O Assuming that federal subsidies as well as transfers from unem- 
ployment insurance stay fixed, we find that payroll taxes for social security and 
health and long-term care insurance need to be raised perpetually by 40.2 and 
3 1.8 percent, respectively. This implies a social security payroll tax rate of 26.1 
10. For a similar exercise for social security only, see Boll et al. (1994). 295  Unification and Aging in Germany: Who Pays and When? 
instead of  18.6 percent in the base year and all future years, a health insurance 
payroll tax rate of  17.3 instead of  13.1 percent, and a payroll tax rate of 2.24 
percent for the new long-term care insurance." In the first decades, annual sur- 
pluses will arise and social insurance schemes will operate as partially funded 
systems. When the demographic burden becomes aggravated, those funds are 
sufficient to partially finance the occurring deficits up to the year 2200. 
The fil-Zing  strategy will have  significant effects on the net payments of 
present,y living agents. As shown in the last column of table 12.8, net payments 
of newborns increase by  $28,100 in present value. A 25-year-old faces a tax 
bill of $352,700, an increase of $49,300 over the baseline. Equalizing the im- 
plicit intergenerational burden of the social insurance system through partial 
funding also virtually eliminates the imbalance between living and future gen- 
erations if  total government spending is considered. This result underscores 
how important the implicit liabilities of the welfare system are for understand- 
ing the sources of intergenerational imbalances in German fiscal policy. It also 
shows that options other than tax increases might have to be considered if rais- 
ing social security and health insurance payroll tax rates once and for all to 26 
and 17 percent, respectively, appears to be politically and economically infea- 
sible. 
12.6  Conclusions 
This paper applies generational accounting to unified Germany. Our findings 
indicate that the current fiscal policy is severely imbalanced from an intergen- 
erational point of view. Future generations are projected to pay  156.1 percent 
more in net lifetime taxes than newborns in 1995, and the imbalance increases 
substantially if the adjustment process in East Germany lasts longer than ex- 
pected in the baseline calculations. We  also illustrate how fiscal balance can 
be restored. Intergenerational balance and thereby a sustainable fiscal policy 
can be achieved by  (1) a 29.5 percent increase of income tax revenues, (2) a 
9.5 percent increase of  all taxes, (3) a reduction of  all transfer payments by 
14.1 percent, or (4) a reduction of government purchases in the magnitude of 
roughly one-fourth. However, since each policy has different implications for 
intragenerational  equity the choice of the appropriate combination of measures 
is up to the politicians. 
The generational imbalance is due to the demographic change induced by 
one of  the world's  lowest fertility rates. It is only partly due to government 
debt, of which approximately one-third is related to the East German transition 
toward a market economy. In addition to purely intergenerational issues, we 
quantify the distribution of unification-related  tax increases among generations 
11. It should be noted that all these results are very optimistic since they assume that per capita 
medical expenditures grow with the level of productivity.  In the United States,  e.g.,  medical expen- 
ditures are projected to grow much faster than productivity. 296  Bernd Raffelhiischen and Jan Walliser 
in West Germany. We find that unification imposes sizable burdens on future 
generations but also on young western  males and females. The paper finally 
illustrates the intergenerational impacts of some of the most recent unification- 
and aging-related policies. From an intergenerational point of view, an early 
elimination of the income tax surcharge alone would lead to a small increase 
in the burden of future generations. Moreover, we demonstrate the effects of a 
partial funding strategy for public health insurance and social security. While 
balancing intergenerational burdens, this policy would require accumulation 
of capital over the next two to three decades through a once and for all increase 
in contribution rates of approximately 13 percent of taxable income. 
Continuing on the current spending path without adjusting taxes and trans- 
fers may cause an exponential increase in the burden of future generations over 
time. In fact, if  another 20 years pass with no changes in policy that address 
the current imbalance, generations born 20 years from now will already face a 
496.6 percent higher lifetime tax burden than newborns. 
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